Robert J. Debry, Joan Debry v. Wallace R. Noble : Brief of Appellee by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1991
Robert J. Debry, Joan Debry v. Wallace R. Noble :
Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David E. Yocom; Salt Lake County Attorney; Paul G. Maughan; Deputy County Attorney; Attorney
for Appellees.
Edward T. Wells; Robert J. Debry; Robert J. Debry & Associates; Attorneys for Appellants.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation







IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST^jL^jIfllSH. 




WALLACE R. NOBLE, Individ-
ually and in his capacity 
as Chief Building Official 
of Salt Lake County; and 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Defendants-Appellees. 






APPEAL FROM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION 
OF THE HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN OF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES WALLACE R. NOBLE 
AND SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DAVID E. YOCOM (3581) 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
PAUL G. MAUGHAN (2124) 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street, #S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees 
Telephone: (801) 468-3420 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
EDWARD T. WELLS 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants FILED 
MAR 1 8 1991 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




WALLACE R. NOBLE, Individ-
ually and in his capacity 
as Chief Building Official 
of Salt Lake County; and 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
APPEAL FROM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION 
OF THE HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN OF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES WALLACE R. NOBLE 
AND SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DAVID E. YOCOM (3581) 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
PAUL G. MAUGHAN (2124) 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street, #S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees 
Telephone: (801) 468-3420 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
EDWARD T. WELLS 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (80:' 262-8915 
Attorneys for P ' nt-i f f s-Aj.^ ..- „i.i:;:.., 
BRIEF OP APPELLEES 
Case No. 900214 
Category 16 
PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING 
The parties to this proceeding are: 
Robert J. DeBry Plaintiff-Appellant 
Joan DeBry Plaintiff-Appellant 
Wallace R. Noble Defendant-Appellee 
Salt Lake County Defendant-Appellee 
Parties in the lower court proceeding not involved in this 
appeal are: 
Cascade Enterprises, a partnership Defendant 
Cascade Construction, a partnership Defendant 
Del K. Bartel Defendant 
Lee Allen Bartel Defendant 
Dale Thurgood Defendant 
Utah Title & Abstract Co. Defendant 
William Trigger dba Trigger Roofing Defendant 
Zephyr Electric, Inc. Defendant 
Tri-K Construction Defendant 
Soter-Knudsen, Inc. Defendant 
Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. Defendant 
Valley Mortgage Corp. Defendant 
Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corp. Defendant 
Sawyer Glass Co. Defendant 
Triad Service Co. Defendant 
Salomon & Alder, Inc. Defendant 
Scott McDonald Realty, Inc. Defendant 
Building Systems, Inc. Defendant 
Builders Components Supply Co. Defendant 
Van L. Ellsworth Defendant 
Ken Bar Manufacturing Defendant 
Canada Life Insurance Company Defendant 
Stanley Postma Defendant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. Nature Of The Case 2 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
in the District Court 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 7 
ARGUMENT 8 
POINT I 
SALT LAKE COUNTY CANNOT BE LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE 
BECAUSE IT OWES NO DUTY TO THE DEBRYS 8 
POINT II 
THE DEBRYS1 CLAIMS AGAINST SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ARE BARRED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT, §63-30-1, ET SEQ., 
UTAH CODE 12 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE 
ARTICLE I §11 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 17 
POINT IV 
THE DEBRYS1 COMPLAINT FAILS TO ALLEGE A CAUSE 
OF ACTION IN FRAUD AGAINST THE COUNTY'S BUILDING 
OFFICIAL FOR WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED 21 
i 
POINT V 
SALT LAKE COUNTY DID NOT VIOLATE THE DEBRYS1 
1ST, 5TH, OR 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
IN ADMINISTERING THE UNIFORM BUILDING CODE . . . . 25 
POINT VI 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT GRANT SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT PREMATURELY 30 
CONCLUSION 32 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Abernethv v. Smith. 498 P.2d 175, 182 
(Ariz. App. 1972) 25, 31 
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415 
(Utah 1986) 9 
Berry By and Through Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 
717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) 19, 20 
Brown v. Wichita State University, 219 Kan. 2, 
8-12, 547 P.2d 1015, 1022-24 (1976) 18 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). . . . 25, 29 
Condeinarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 
(Utah 1989) 13, 14, 17, 19 
Davis Stock Co. v. Hill. 268 P.2d 988, 2 U.2d 20 
(Utah 1954) 22 
DeBry v. Salt Lake County, 764 P.2d 627 
(Utah App. 1988) 7, 27 
Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman. 740 P.2d 275 
(Utah App. 1987) 31 
Duqan v. Jones. 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980) 21 
Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). . . 2, 9, 11, 12 
Gillroan v. Dept. of Financial Inst.. 782 P.2d 506 
(Utah 1989) 15, 16, 17, 21 
Hansen v. Salt Lake County. 794 P.2d 838, 845-846 
(Utah 1990) 20 
Lakeside Condominium "C" Association v. Frediani 
Developers, Inc.. 482 N.E.2d 665 (111. App. 1 
Dist. 1985) 10 
Loveland v. Orem City. 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987) 17, 22 
Madsen v. Borthick. 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983) 18, 19 
iii 
Mascaro v. Davis. 741 P.2d 938, 944 (Utah 1987) 28 
Mathews v. Eldredqe, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) 27 
McCrav v. United States. 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904) 29 
Metropolitan Finance v. State of Utah, 714 P.2d 293 
(Utah 1986) 14, 15, 17 
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 63 L.Ed.2d 673, 
689-691 18 
Reeves v. Geicfy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 642 
(Utah App. 1988) 25, 29 
Siple v. Citv of Topeka, 679 P.2d 190, 195 (Kan. 1984). . . . 10 
Standiford v. Salt Lake Citv, 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980) . . . 12 
Taylor v. Stevens County, 759 P.2d 447 (Wash. 1988) . . . . 9, 11 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) 29 
Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co., 656 P.2d 966, 972 
(Utah 1982) 21 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., §24.552 
554, pp. 233, 236 30 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-1, et seq 1, 12 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 2, 12 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-4 2 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-4(3) & (4) 19 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10 2, 7, 13 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(6) 22 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (3) (j) 1 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, §11 1, 2, 7, 18, 19 
iv 
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
This is an appeal by Robert and Joan Debry from a final 
order of the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Pat B. 
Brian, granting summary judgment to the defendants Salt Lake 
County and Wallace R. Noble. (The order is attached as Appendix 
A)• The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to the provisions of §78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for determination in this 
appeal: 
1. Whether Salt Lake County owes a duty to the Debrys 
separate from its duty to the public at large in administering 
the Uniform Building Code. 
2. Whether the District Court correctly ruled that the 
County and its building official are immune from suit pursuant to 
the provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act, §63-3 0-1 et. 
seq. Utah Code. 
3. Whether the District Court correctly ruled that the 
Governmental Immunity Act does not violate the provisions of 
Article 1 §11 of the Utah Constitution. 
4. Whether the District Court correctly ruled that the 
DeBrys had not sufficiently pled a cause of action in fraud 
against the County's building official, Wallace R. Noble, in his 
individual capacity. 
1 
5. Whether the District Court correctly ruled that the 
County had not violated the DeBry's 1st, 5th, and 14th amendment 
rights under the United States Constitution. 
6. Whether the District Court granted summary judgment 
prematurely. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing an appeal from a summary judgment this Court 
resolves only legal issues, and does not defer to the trial 
court's rulings. "The Court determines only whether the trial 
court erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial 
court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of 
material fact." Ferree v. State.1 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The County relies on Article 1 §11 Utah Constitution and 
Sections 63-30-3, 4, and 10 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
in effect at the time this action was instituted. The complete 
text of these provisions is set forth in Appendix B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. 
In December of 1985 the DeBrys finalized their purchase a 
newly constructed building located in the unincorporated area of 
1
 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). 
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Salt Lake County. They subsequently discovered alleged defects 
in the building and brought an action for damages against, inter 
alia, the sellers, the contractor, numerous subcontractors and 
suppliers, the architect, the designer, the real estate company, 
the lenders, the mortgage company, the title company, Salt Lake 
County, and its building official, Wallace Ray Noble. 
This appeal involves only Salt Lake County and Mr. Noble. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the District Court. 
The District Court granted summary judgment to Salt Lake 
County and its building official, Wallace Ray Noble, ruling that 
they were immune from suit pursuant to the provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act; that the Act was not unconstitutional; 
and that the Debrys had not been deprived of their 1st, 5th, and 
14th amendment rights. 
The District Court also granted summary judgment to Wallace 
R. Noble individually, ruling that the Debrys had not pled an 
action in fraud with sufficient specificity. The District Court 
granted the DeBry's motion for 54(b) certification making the 
order of summary judgment a final order. (R. 16829). The DeBrys 
have appealed the District Court's rulings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case demonstrate the following: 
1. On November 16, 1984, upon application of Cascade 
Construction, Salt Lake County issued a "footings and foundation 
3 
permit" for a commercial building to be constructed at 4 252 South 
700 East in the unincorporated area of Salt Lake County. (R. 
2243; 4039). 
2. On or about May 30, 1985, during construction of the 
building, the DeBrys signed an earnest money sales agreement to 
purchase the building from Cascade Construction. (R. 2428; 3436). 
3. On December 6, 1985, at the request of Del Bartel and 
Cascade Construction, and in reliance upon statements made by 
Bartel that all necessary permits for the building had been 
obtained by Cascade Construction, the Building Official of Salt 
Lake County issued a temporary, 3 0-day certificate of occupancy 
for the building. (Attached as Appendix C). (R. 2068; R-3768). 
4. As of December 6, 1985, the Building Official had never 
before met Del Bartel, nor had he met or had any conversations or 
contact with the plaintiffs, Robert and Joan DeBry. (R. 3 768). 
5. The Building Official observed that the building was 
not complete on December 6th, but based upon an inspection that 
had just been performed by another County inspector, determined 
that there appeared to be no substantial hazard that would result 
from allowing temporary occupancy of the building for 3 0 days 
while the building was being completed and brought into 
compliance with code requirements. (R. 3768). 
6. The DeBrys closed their purchase of the building on or 
about December 10, 1985, knowing that the building was not 
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complete and that additional work on the building was still 
needed. (R. 3452-61). 
7. Subsequent to issuing the temporary, 30-day certificate 
of occupancy, the County determined that a building permit had 
never been issued to Cascade Construction for other than the 
construction of the footings and foundation. (R. 2242; 3769). 
8. On or about March 17, 1986, Salt Lake County performed 
a partial inspection of the property and informed the Debrys by 
letter dated March 19, 1986 of the minimum deficiencies contained 
in the building that needed to be corrected before a certificate 
of occupancy would be issued. (Attached as Appendix D). (R. 3772-
74). 
9. On May 15, 1986 the DeBrys were again notified by the 
County that they were occupying the building without a valid 
certificate of occupancy and were again requested to obtain a 
building permit. (Attached as Appendix E). (R. 3775). 
10. On or about October 20, 1986 the DeBrys served the 
County with an affidavit of Kenneth William Karren, Jr., a state 
licensed civil engineer, in which he stated that he had inspected 
the building and had identified serious violations of the Uniform 
Building Code in the building. (R. 2146; 27212) . 
The affidavit of Mr. Karren at R. 2146 is substantially 
similar, though not as detailed, to the affidavit received by the 
County on Nov. 20, 1986. 
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11. Based in part upon this affidavit, the County concluded 
that the building constituted a hazard to the life and safety of 
the occupants of the building and served the DeBrys with a Notice 
and Order to Vacate the building dated November 3, 1986. 
(Attached as Appendix F). (R. 2721; 3776). 
12. The order was additionally issued due to the fact the 
DeBrys had failed to correct code violations, submit as-built 
plans, obtain a building permit, obtain a certificate of 
occupancy, and pay required fees. The Notice and Order outlined 
the conditions upon which Salt Lake County would perform a final 
inspection so that a certificate of occupancy could be issued (R. 
3776). 
13. The Debrys appealed the notice and order to the Salt 
Lake County Board of Appeals, which heard the matter on December 
12, 1986. (R. 2724-25). 
14. The Board denied the DeBrys1 request for an extension 
of time in which to vacate the building, and refused to order the 
Building Official to make additional inspections until the DeBrys 
had complied with the provisions of the Notice and Order. 
(Attached as Appendix G). (R. 2724-25). 
15. The DeBrys petitioned the Utah Court of Appeals for 
direct appellate review of the Board's decision. The Court of 
6 
Appeals dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.3 No other 
appellate relief was sought by the DeBrys. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Salt Lake County owes no duty to the DeBrys in the 
administration of the Uniform Building Code. The DeBrys can not 
establish "negligence" until they first establish a "duty" owed 
to them by the County. The only duty the County owes the DeBrys, 
in this case, is the duty the County owes to the public at large. 
The District Court correctly granted summary judgment in 
this action on the basis of governmental immunity. This Court 
has consistently held that the issuance of orders, certificates, 
and permits, and the making of inspections by government 
employees are governmental functions. These activities are 
specifically listed as exceptions to the legislative waiver of 
governmental immunity in §63-30-10 of the Act. 
The Governmental Immunity Act is not unconstitutional under 
the provisions of Article I §11 of the Utah State Constitution, 
the "open courts" provision. This Court has previously upheld 
the constitutionality of the Act against an Article I §11 
challenge. 
The District Court correctly ruled that the DeBrys had 
failed to plead an action in fraud with sufficient particularity 
3
 DeBrv v. Salt Lake County, 764 P.2d 627 (Utah App. 1988). 
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against the County's building official, in his individual 
capacity, to withstand a motion for summary judgment. 
The District Court correctly ruled that the DeBrys1 1st, 
5th, and 14th amendment rights were not violated by the County 
when the County ordered the DeBrys to vacate the building. The 
Notice and Order was based on the DeBrys1 failure to obtain a 
certificate of occupancy and on their submission of an affidavit 
of a licensed engineer stating that the building contained 
serious building code violations. 
The District Court did not grant summary judgment 
prematurely. The DeBrys1 did not object to the court hearing the 
County's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that 
discovery had not been completed. In fact the DeBrys argued 
their own motion for summary judgment at the same time,, A 
request for additional discovery was never raised, nor was there 
a request or notice for additional discovery outstanding at the 
time the District Court granted summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SALT LAKE COUNTY CANNOT BE LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE 
BECAUSE IT OWES NO DUTY TO THE DEBRYS. 
Before the DeBrys can establish negligence on the part of 
the County, they must first establish that the County owed them a 
8 
duty of care in administering the Uniform Building Code. This 
Court recently reaffirmed its adherence to the "public duty 
doctrine" in Ferree v. State.5 by holding: 
"For a governmental agency and its agents to 
be liable for negligently caused injury 
suffered by a member of the public, the 
plaintiff must show a breach of a duty owed 
him as an individual, not merely the breach 
of an obligation owed to the general public 
at large by the governmental official." 
(Emphasis added). Id. at 151. 
In accord is Taylor v. Stevens County6 where the 
Washington Supreme Court held: 
"We hold that Stevens County cannot be 
held liable for its alleged negligence in 
administering its building code. The duty to 
ensure that buildings comply with county and 
municipal building codes rests with individual 
builders, developers and permit applicants, 
not local government." (Emphasis added). Id. 
at 449. 
That Court then reiterated its previous adherence to the 
rule by stating: 
"This court and the Court of Appeals has 
on numerous occasions rejected the contention 
that building codes impose a duty upon local 
governments to enforce the provisions of such 
codes for the benefit of individuals. 
(Citations omitted.) * * * [T]he duty to 
issue building permits and conduct inspections 
is to protect the health and safety of the 
general public. Accordingly, we continue to 
adhere to the traditional public duty rule 
4
 Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P. 2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986). 
5
 784 P.2d 149, (Utah 1989). 
6
 759 P.2d 447, (Wash. 1988). 
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that building codes impose duties that are 
owed to the public at large," (Emphasis 
added) . Id, at 45o"7 
The DeBrys have not alleged that the County owes them 
a duty other than as members of the general public. Paragraph 41 
of DeBrys1 complaint alleges that the County had a duty to 
enforce the Uniform Building Code which was "promulgated for the 
protection of plaintiffs and other members of the general public" 
(R. 3385)• Paragraph 46 of their complaint alleges the County 
failed to warn the DeBrys "and other members of the general 
public of defects in the building". (R. 3386). These broad 
allegations are insufficient to impose a duty of due Ccire on the 
County. 
Absent a showing by the DeBrys that the County owes them a 
special duty, the DeBrys have no cause of action against the 
County. In Lakeside Condominium "C" Association v. Fre^diani 
Developers, Inc.,8 a case directly on point, the plaintiffs sued 
the Village of Lakeside for negligent enforcement of its building 
code. In affirming the dismissal of the action the Illinois 
Appellate Court held: 
"The law is clear that there is no common 
law duty to members of the general public for 
a municipality's failure to enforce an 
ordinance. Liability arises only when a 
special duty is owed to the particular 
See also Siple v. City of Topeka, 679 P.2d 190, 195 (Kan. 
1984). "Inspection laws do not create a duty to an individual." 
8
 482 N.E.2d 665, (111. App. 1 Dist. 1985). 
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plaintiff different from that owed to the 
public at large. (Citations omitted.) A 
special duty arises when the entity steps out 
of its governmental function and acts in a 
private capacity or develops a "relationship" 
to the plaintiff." (Emphasis added). Id at 
666. 
The DeBrys have not established that the County acted in a 
"private capacity" or that such a special "relationship" exists 
between themselves and the County. They do not even allege that 
Mr. Noble made any representations directly to them regarding the 
building prior to their purchase of it. Mr. Noble's affidavit is 
uncontroverted that at the time he issued the temporary 
certificate of occupancy, he did not know the DeBrys and had 
never spoken to them. (R. 3768). The record contains no facts 
that establish a special relationship between the DeBrys and the 
County. 
In addressing the special relationship exception in the 
context of building inspections, the Washington Supreme Court in 
Taylor, supra held: 
[T]he special relationship exception to the 
public duty doctrine has no application where 
a claimant alleges negligent enforcement of 
building codes because local government owes 
no duty of care to ensure compliance with the 
codes. (Emphasis added) Id. at 452. 
This Court in Ferree stated: 
"To adopt plaintiffs1 theories would 
impose too broad a duty of care on the part of 
corrections officers toward individual members 
of the public." Id. at 151. 
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The rationale of Ferree is controlling, and based on the 
cases cited above, its holding should be extended by determining 
that local governments owe no duty to individual members of the 
public in the administration of local building codes.9 
POINT II 
THE DEBRYS1 CLAIMS AGAINST SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ARE BARRED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT, S63-30-1. ET SEP., 
UTAH CODE. 
The DeBrys1 action against the County fails due to the 
provisions of Utah's Governmental Immunity Act.10 Section 63-30-
3, Utah Code, provides in part: 
"Except as may be otherwise provided in 
this chapter, all governmental entities are 
immune from suit for any injury which results 
from a governmental function." 
In 1980 the Supreme Court in Standiford v. Salt Lake City 
Corp.11 adopted a new standard for determining governmental 
immunity under this section. The Court held that the test is: 
"...whether the activity under consideration 
is of such a unique nature that it can only be 
performed by a governmental agency or that it 
is essential to the core of governmental 
activity." Id. at 1236, 1237. 
9
 If the Court determines that the County owes no duty of care 
to the plaintiffs, it "need not reach the questions raised by the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity". Xd. at 152. 
10§63-30-1, et seq., Utah Code. 
11605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980). 
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Following Standiford the inquiry as to whether immunity 
existed depended upon whether the activity at issue constituted a 
"governmental function." The issue before the Court is whether 
the acts of issuing certificates, permits and orders, and 
conducting inspections are governmental functions and therefore 
immune. This Court has repeatedly held that the activities 
listed in Section 10 of the Act are governmental functions for 
which governmental entities and their employees are immune from 
suit. Section 63-30-10 of the Act in effect at the time this 
action was filed, provides in part: 
"Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury:... 
(c) Arises out of the issuance, denial, 
suspension, or revocation of, or by the 
failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or 
revoke, any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization; or 
(d) Arises out of a failure to make an 
inspection or by reason of making an 
inadequate or negligent inspection of any 
property; or... 
(f) Arises out of a misrepresentation by 
the employee whether or not it is negligent or 
intentional...." (Emphasis added.) 
In Condemarin v. University Hospital,12 Justice Durham wrote 
that the activities excepted in §63-30-10(1) (a) through (1) are 
12
 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989). 
13 
all governmental functions and therefore immune from suit: 
"In addition, immunity of governmental 
entities is waived for injuries caused by 
employee negligence committed within the scope 
of employment except where the injuries arise 
out of certain specific activities listed in 
§63-30-10(1)(a) to (1). Each of the 
activities listed in Section 10 is, 
interestingly, within the 'core1 of 
governmental functions discussed in 
Standiford. Each is of 'such a unique nature 
that it can only be performed by a 
governmental agency or that it is essential to 
the core of governmental activity,' 
Standiford, 605 P. 2d at 1237." (Emphasis 
added). Id. at 350. 
The DeBrys claim that the County and its employees were 
negligent in issuing a building permit, negligent in issuing a 
certificate of occupancy, and negligent in conducting inspections 
of the property. Even if Debrys' allegations were true, Section 
10 of the Governmental Immunity Act retains the County's immunity 
from suit for the negligent issuance of a permit or for the 
performance of negligent inspections. 
In a per curiam opinion issued prior to Condemarin, supra, 
in Metropolitan Finance v. State of Utah,13 this Court held that 
activities specified in Section 10 of the Governmental Immunity 
Act were "governmental functions" and affirmed a grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the State Tax Commission. Employees of the 
Motor Vehicle Division had erroneously issued a certificate of 
13
 714 P.2d 293 (Utah 1986). 
title for a motor vehicle to someone other than the owner. The 
Court held: 
"We need only observe that the statutory 
waiver of immunity for negligence does not 
apply when plaintiff's alleged injury arises 
out of the issuance of title certificates or 
the misrepresentations or omissions of 
defendant's employees (citation of section 63-
30-10) and plaintiff's allegations of 
negligence and conspiracy are clearly 
circumscribed within these...statutory 
exceptions to any immunity waiver. 
Therefore, even assuming that the facts 
alleged by plaintiff are true, the 
Governmental Immunity Act does not waive 
immunity from suit for the negligent or 
intentional performance by defendants of these 
governmental functions. The summary judgment 
against plaintiff is affirmed." (Emphasis 
added.) Id. at 294, 295. 
Finally, in Gillman v. Dept. of Financial Inst.,14 this 
Court again upheld a summary judgment on the basis of 
governmental immunity in a negligence action brought against the 
state for failing to revoke a license of a thrift institution 
after inspecting the institution's records. The plaintiff in 
Gillman attempted to draft the complaint to bring each cause of 
action within the waiver provisions of Section 10 of the Immunity 
Act. The Court dismissed those claims and held: 
"An examination of Gillman's arguments in 
detail demonstrates that, at their heart, all 
are futile attempts to obscure the fact that 
the claims asserted are for injuries arising 
out of licensing decisions allegedly made in 
a negligent fashion. As such they are all 
782 P.2d 506 (Utah 1989). 
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immune from suit under section 63-30-10(3) .f" 
(Emphasis added). Id. at 509. 
The Court concluded by adopting the following policy reasons 
articulated by the California Law Revision Commission for 
upholding the Governmental Immunity Act: 
"Public entities and public employees 
should not be liable for failure to make 
arrests or otherwise to enforce any law. They 
should not be liable for failing to inspect 
persons or property adequately to determine 
compliance with health and safety regulations. 
Nor should they be liable for negligent or 
wrongful issuance or revocation of licenses 
and permits. The government has undertaken 
these activities to insure public health and 
safety. To provide the utmost public 
protection, governmental entities should not 
be dissuaded from engaging in such activities 
by the fear that liability may be imposed if 
an employee performs his duties inadequately.. 
Moreover, if liability existed for this type 
of activity, the risk exposure to which a 
public entity would be subject would include 
virtually all activities going on within the 
c ommun i ty. There would be potential 
government liability for all building defects, 
for all crimes, and for all outbreaks of 
contagious disease. No private person is 
subjected to risks of this magnitude.... Far 
more persons would suffer if government did 
not perform these functions at all than would 
be benefitted by permitting recovery in those 
cases where the government is shown to have 
performed inadequately. (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 512, 513. 
The issuance of permits and certificates, and the conducting 
of inspections are governmental functions for which immunity has 
expressly been retained pursuant to Section 10 of the Act. The 
16 
DeBrys1 action is therefore barred by the Governmental Immunity 
Act. 
The DeBrys have cited numerous cases from other 
jurisdictions in support of their argument that the County should 
be held liable for making negligent inspections. These cases are 
uniformly from jurisdictions which have a different statutory 
framework than Utah!s. However, the major fallacy of the DeBrys1 
argument is that they totally ignore Utah law regarding 
governmental immunity, as set forth in this Court's most recent 
decisions. No mention is made of the dispositive cases of 
Gillman, Condemarin, Metropolitan Finance or Loveland v. Orem 
DeBrys also argue that material issues of fact exist which 
preclude summary judgment. Their argument is without merit 
because the determination of what activities constitute 
governmental functions are legal issues to be determined by the 
courts; they are not issues of fact as the cases cited above 
clearly demonstrate. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE 
ARTICLE I Sll OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
This Court has previously upheld the constitutionality of 
the Governmental Immunity Act against an Article I §11 challenge. 
15
 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987), infra. 
17 
In Madsen v. Borthick, this Court held: 
"Sovereign immunity—the principle that 
the state cannot be sued in its own courts 
without its consent—was a well-settled 
principle of American common law at the time 
Utah became a state*. (Citations omitted) . 
Article 1 §11 of the Utah Constitution, which 
prescribes that all courts shall be open and 
persons shall not be barred from using them to 
redress injuries, was not meant to create a 
new remedy or a new right of action, 
(Citation omitted). Consequently, Article 1. 
Sll worked no change in the principle of 
sovereign immunity, and sovereign immunity is 
not unconstitutional under that section. It 
was so held in Brown v. Wichita State 
University, 219 Kan. 2, 8-12, 547 P.2d 1015, 
1022-24 (1976), which involved a similar 
provision of the Kansas Constitution. We 
concur in the reasoning and result of the 
decision." (Emphasis added) Id. at 629. 
Counties and local governments were also clothed with 
sovereign immunity in the performance of governmental functions 
17 18 . 
at statehood. The DeBrys so concede. Since both state and 
local governments enjoyed sovereign immunity at the time of 
statehood then the provisions of Article I §11 do not deny the 
DeBrys any right of action under the state constitution. The 
DeBrys admit that in order to prevail this Court must ireverse the 
holding of the District Court and find that the issuing of 
10
 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). 
17
 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 63 L. Ed 2d 673, 
689-691. 
18 
Appellant's Brief p. 17. 
orders, permits, and certificates, and making inspections are 
"proprietary" rather than "governmental" functions.19 However, 
as demonstrated in Point II, this Court has repeatedly held that 
these activities are "governmental functions". 
The DeBrys further argue that to the extent the governmental 
immunity act prohibits a cause of action against the County's 
building official, except for fraud or malice, it violates the 
provisions of Article 1 §11.20 This argument was also rejected 
by the Court in Madsen, supra. After considering the 
implications of Article I §11, this Court specifically upheld the 
constitutionality of the 1978 amendments to the Act which 
extended immunity to governmental employees acting within the 
scope of their employment, except as specifically authorized by 
the Act.21 
Since Madsen, this Court has decided two additional cases 
involving Article I §11 claims: Berry By and Through Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft22 and Condemarin v. University Hospital, supra. 
In Berry the Court stated: 
Appellants1 brief p.18. 
20
 §63-30-4 (3) & (4) provide that a governmental employee may 
be joined in a representative capacity in a suit against the 
entity, but may not be held personally liable except for fraud or 
malice. The complete text is set forth in Appendix B. 
21
 Id. at 633. 
22
 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). 
19 
11
 [N] either the due process nor the open 
courts provision constitutionalizes the common 
law or otherwise freezes the law governing 
private rights and remedies as of the time of 
statehood. *** It is, in fact, one of the 
important functions of the Legislature to 
change and modify the law that governs 
relations between individuals as society 
evolves and conditions require. 
*** 
[S]ection 11 rights are not always 
paramount, either. They do not sweep all 
other constitutional rights and prerogatives 
before them. They, too, like many 
constitutional rights, must be weighed against 
and harmonized with other constitutional 
provisions. The accommodation of competing, 
and sometimes clashing, constitutional rights 
and prerogatives is a task of the greatest 
delicacy, although a common and necessary one 
in constitutional adjudication. Id. at 676-
677. 
The County agrees with the two part test this Court adopted 
in Berry as set forth in the Appellantfs brief at page 15. 
However, the County submits that the DeBrys1 arguments satisfy 
neither element of the test. First, the Act does not totally ban 
all causes of action or grant absolute immunity to either 
government entities or to their employees.23 The Act generally 
waives governmental immunity except for specified activities. 
Immunity for governmental entities is also waived for employee 
negligence committed within the scope of employment, except for 
the specified activities listed in Section 10 of the Act. 
Employees may still be sued in a representative capacity for 
" Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 845-846 (Utah 
1990). 
nongovernmental functions and individually for acts of fraud or 
malice. 
Second, sound policy reasons exist for granting immunity to 
government entities and their employees in performing 
governmental functions. These policy considerations were adopted 
by this Court in Gillman, supra and are set forth in Point II at 
pages 16. 
POINT IV 
THE DEBRYS' COMPLAINT FAILS TO ALLEGE A CAUSE OF ACTION 
IN FRAUD AGAINST THE COUNTY'S BUILDING OFFICIAL 
FOR WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. 
Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that all 
matters alleging fraud be stated with particularity. This Court 
has held: 
"'Fraud1 or 'fraudulent1 are terms of 
uncertain meaning. There are conclusions that 
must be flushed out by elaboration and by 
consideration of the context in which they are 
used. This is why Rule 9(b) requires that the 
circumstances constituting fraud fshall be 
stated with particularity,' a requirement we 
have construed to require allegation of the 
substance of the acts constituting the alleged 
wrong." Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co., 
656 P.2d 966, 972 (Utah 1982). 
An essential element of proving fraud is the requirement 
"that a representation must be made knowingly, willfully, and 
with intent to deceive."24 The Debrys have not pled that Mr. 
Noble made any representation to them regarding their purchase of 
24Duqan v. Jones. 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980). 
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the building, let alone a statement made by him with the intent 
to deceive. The DeBrys aver that "the signed temporary 
certificate of occupancy was a representation to the citizens of 
Salt Lake County...." only. (R. 3387). Such representations are, 
without more, clothed with immunity.25 Governments are immune 
from suit for injuries arising out of: 
"a misrepresentation by the employee whether 
or not it is negligent or intentional;26 
The principle of law governing the deficiencies in the 
Debrys1 complaint was set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Davis Stock Co. v. Hill,27. In upholding the dismissal of an 
amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action for 
fraud the Court held: 
"This court has several times held that 
one of the basic elements of pleading a cause 
of action based upon fraud is the materiality 
of the alleged false representation. In 
certain instances the pleader can meet this 
requirement by simply alleging the 
representation and its falsity for by the very 
nature of the representation it must be either 
true or false in its entirety. Classic 
examples in this regard include some matters 
of status and such matters as blood lines. A 
person is either married or he is not; a horse 
is either a thoroughbred or it is not. But in 
the great majority of cases the materiality of 
a false representation cannot be ascertained 
Loveland v. Orem City Corp. , 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987). City 
was immune for representations made to plaintiffs regarding the 
condition of land pursuant to §63-30-10 subparagraphs (c) & (f). 
26
 §63-30-10(6) Utah Code 
27
 268 P.2d 988, 2 U.2d 20 (Utah 1954). 
22 
unless the true fact is alleged with 
particularity. 
In the instant case the significance of 
the alleged misrepresentation cannot be 
ascertained in the absence of knowledge of the 
true facts. Roofs ordinarily leak and heating 
plants fail to be "in excellent condition" in 
degrees rather than in toto. 
Misrepresentations relative to fuel bills, 
gross income and operating expenses may be of 
so little importance as to fall within the 
rule of de minimis, or of so great a 
significance as to be the proper basis of an 
action for fraud. The materiality of the 
allegations is dependent upon the true facts. 
The trial court properly held that the 
complaint did not state a claim in fraud." 
(Emphasis added). Ijd. at 989, 990. 
In the present case, the DeBrys allege that by issuing a 
temporary certificate of occupancy Mr. Noble fraudulently 
represented to the "general public" the following: (a) the 
possession by the County of approved plans; (b) the issuance of a 
valid building permit; (c) that all inspections required had been 
performed on the property; (d) that no work on the property had 
proceeded beyond the point indicated in each successive 
inspection; (e) that all work on the building had been done in 
accordance with approved plans; and (f) a special finding by the 
Building Official that no substantial hazard would result from 
occupancy of the building. (R. 3387-3388). 
The County did issue a footings and foundations permit based 
on submitted plans. (R. 4039). It performed at least one 
inspection and in addition, the Building Official made a finding 
that, in his opinion, no substantial hazard would result by 
23 
allowing limited occupancy of the substantially completed 
building for thirty days. (R. 3768). The certificate of 
occupancy was specific in its terms and it imposed additional 
requirements which were to have been performed within the 3 0 day 
occupancy period. (R. 3768). None of the requirements were 
completed by either the contractor or the DeBrys within the time 
frame required by the certificate. 
The DeBrys knew that the building was incomplete at the time 
that the temporary certificate of occupancy was issued and at the 
time they closed on the building. They knew additional work was 
needed to completed the building and that occupancy of the 
building had been permitted for only 3 0 days. In light of this 
knowledge, they could not have relied on the temporary 
certificate for any more than what its express language stated: 
"OK for temporary occupancy for 30 days....11 (R. 3116), 
That the County has been alleged to have been negligent in 
conducting the review process for this building regarding permits 
and inspections does not constitute fraud on the part of Mr. 
Noble. 
On a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party 
cannot merely rely on its pleadings, but has a duty: 
"to make a showing sufficient to establish 
the existence of an element essential to that 
24 
party's case, and on which that party will 
bear the burden of proof at trial." 28 
Otherwise there can be no genuine issue of material fact. It was 
therefore incumbent upon the DeBrys, at the time of hearing on 
the County's motion for summary judgment, to establish that a 
misrepresentation was made to them directly by Mr. Noble, which 
was false, upon which they relied to their detriment, and which 
was sufficient to abrogate Mr. Noble's immunity under §63-30-
10(f) of the Immunity Act. This they failed to do and the 
District Court correctly granted summary judgment to Mr. Noble. 
POINT V 
SALT LAKE COUNTY DID NOT VIOLATE THE DEBRYS1 
1ST, 5TH, OR 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
IN ADMINISTERING THE UNIFORM BUILDING CODE 
The essence of the DeBrys' constitutional claim is that they 
were denied a property interest in their building without due 
process of law. In paragraphs 58 and 59 of their complaint the 
DeBrys allege that "as a direct result of the notice to vacate" 
the County "wrongfully deprived [them] of the use of their 
building" and "that their freedom of enterprise and occupation 
has been taken away". (R. 3390). 
Reeves v. Geicrv Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 642 
(Utah App. 1988); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322 
(1986); Abernethy v. Smith. 498 P.2d 175, 182 (Ariz. App. 1972). 
25 
The DeBrys had no reasonable expectation of a property 
interest in the occupancy of the building because they failed to 
comply with the conditions precedent for obtaining a certificate 
of occupancy. As of the date of the Notice to Vacate they had no 
approved plans for the building, had not obtained a building 
permit, had not paid required fees, had not obtained a final 
inspection, and had not corrected known code violations. The 
DeBrys made no showing that they were entitled to a certificate 
of occupancy or that the County had wrongfully withheld the 
issuance of one. The DeBrys were occupying the building in 
violation of the law. Therefore the DeBrys were not wirongfully 
deprived of any property right. 
However, a review of the record demonstrates that the DeBrys 
were nevertheless accorded due process regarding the Notice to 
Vacate. Once the County became aware that the building had been 
constructed without the required approved plans and building 
permit, the County notified both the contractor and the DeBrys on 
several occasions to bring the building into compliance with the 
requirements of the Uniform Building Code. (R. 3772, 3775). 
In October of 1986 the DeBrys still had not obtained a 
building permit or submitted approved plans, nor had they met any 
other requirements of the building code that entitled them to 
receive a final certificate of occupancy. On October 20, 1986 
the DeBrys put the County on notice that, in the sworn opinion of 
26 
Kenneth Karren, a state licensed engineer, the building contained 
serious building code violations. Based upon the above the County 
determined the building in its current state constituted a hazard 
to the life and safety of its occupants and served the DeBrys 
with a Notice and Order to Vacate the building. (R. 2146, 2721). 
The DeBrys then appealed the Notice to Vacate to the 
County's Board of Appeals, which denied the DeBrys1 request for 
additional time to vacate and ordered the DeBrys to vacate the 
building. (R. 2724). The DeBrys then appealed the boardfs 
decision to the Utah Court of Appeals.29 
The County respectfully submits that the administrative and 
judicial review available to the DeBrys after the issuance of the 
Notice to Vacate accorded them full due process of law regarding 
all of their claimed "property interests" in the use of the 
building and in the pursuit of their occupation.30 
Based upon the DeBrys1 pleadings, the filed affidavits and 
arguments of counsel, the District Court specifically ruled: 
"The Court further finds that the plaintiffs 
have not been deprived of their First, Fifth 
or Fourteenth Amendment rights under the 
United States Constitution by virtue of Salt 
Lake County's having issued a Notice and Order 
to Vacate the plaintiff's premises." (R-
4244) . 
^ DeBrv v. Salt Lake County, 764 P. 2d 627 (Utah App. 1988). 
The Court of Appeals dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction 
and the DeBrys did not seek any further judicial review. 
30
 Mathews v. Eldredge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
27 
The District Court did not rule, as the DeBrys now argue, that 
the County was "immune from the DeBrys1 constitutional claims".31 
On appeal the DeBrys now abandon the constitutional 
arguments they made to the District Court and approach the issue 
from an entirely different tack. They present two entirely 
different arguments for the first time on appeal contrary to the 
principles of appellate review.32 First, they argue that their 
constitutional rights were impinged because the County issued the 
notice to vacate the building "as retaliation for the DeBrys 
filing a complaint...against the County."33 Second, they argue 
that it was the County's alleged failure to enforce the Uniform 
Building Code prior to their purchase of the building that was 
the cause of their alleged constitutional deprivations. There 
is no factual or legal basis in the record to support either 
argument. 
As the County established in Point V herein, on the County's 
motion for summary judgment, it was the DeBrys1 duty "to make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to ...[their] case and on which...[they] will bear the 
31
 Appellants1 brief, p. 41. 
32
 Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 944, (Utah 1987): "Matters 
not raised at the trial court level will not be considered by this 
Court on appeal." 
33
 Appellants brief p. 36. 
28 
burden of proof at trial". The DeBrys produced no evidence at 
the hearing which established either a retaliatory motive on the 
part of the County or the lack of a lawful basis for issuing the 
Notice to Vacate. The DeBrys not only failed to prove these 
allegations, they did not even raise them. 
The United States Supreme Court has held: 
"The decisions of this court from the 
beginning lend no support whatever to the 
assumption that the judiciary may restrain the 
exercise of lawful power on the assumption 
that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused 
the power to be exerted." 
In Point I of the County's brief, the County established it 
owed no duty to the DeBrys in the enforcement of the building 
code. Since the County owes no duty to individuals in enforcing 
the building code, the County did not deny the Debrys1 their 
constitutional rights for allegedly failing to enforce it on 
behalf of the general public. 
"A municipal corporation may prohibit the 
use and occupancy of certain buildings, where 
the prohibition is justified as a proper 
exercise of the police power to protect the 
public health, safety, welfare and morals. It 
may, for example, prohibit the use or 
occupancy of a building or portion thereof for 
failure to comply with the requirements of an 
ordinance, where the owner of occupant fails, 
after notice to make the building comply 
therewith." 
* * * 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra; Reeves, supra. 
35
 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) citing 
McCrav v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904). 
29 
"Unquestionably it is the official duty 
of city officials charged with the 
responsibility of administering and enforcing 
municipal building codes and ordinances to 
discharge that responsibility faithfully, 
exercising sound judgment where discretion is 
vested in them, but courts will not interfere 
with their exercise of discretion except for 
abuse thereof. It has been held that mandamus 
does not lie to compel a city to enforce 
building regulation. Moreover, the neglect of 
a municipality and its officers or employees 
to enforce the detailed provisions of a 
building code creates no civil liability to 
individuals.11 McQuillin, Municipal 
Corporations, 3rd Ed., §24.552. 554, pp. 233, 
236. 
The County's enforcement of the building code constituted a 
lawful exercise of its police power, not a deprivation of the 
DeBrys' constitutional rights. 
POINT VI 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT 
GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT PREMATURELY 
At the time the Court heard the County's motion for summary 
judgment, it also heard the DeBrys' motion for partial summary 
judgment. The DeBrys made no objection at the time of hearing 
regarding the prematurity of either their or the County's motion, 
nor did they request a continuance to conduct further discovery. 
They had completed their discovery of the County several months 
prior to the hearing.36 At the time summary judgment was 
The DeBrys sought no additional discovery of the County 
after the County responded to the DeBrys' Request for Admissions 
and Interrogatory on December 4, 1986. (R. 2078). 
30 
entered there were no outstanding requests or notices for 
additional discovery. 
The DeBrys1 reliance on Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman' 
is misplaced, for this Court there stated: 
"[A] court should deny a motion to continue 
[discovery] if the motion opposing summary 
judgment is dilatory or without merit." Id. at 
278. 
The Arizona Court of Appeals addressed an identical 
38 
situation in Abernethy v. Smith. That Court held: 
"We find no merit in plaintiffs1 argument 
on appeal that the granting of summary 
judgment was premature and deprived them of 
further discovery. Plaintiffs had ample 
opportunity...to request a continuance of the 
summary judgment motions until discovery was 
completed. There is no indication in the 
record that plaintiffs made such a request 
and, in fact, there seems to be no complaint 
registered by plaintiffs until the opening 
brief. Id. at 182-183. 
The DeBrys allege that further discovery would have 
elicited facts that may have precluded summary judgment. In 
support thereof, they cite depositions of County employees which 
were taken in 1990 as part of a separate federal court action. 
These depositions were taken nearly three years after the grant 
of summary judgment in this case. They add nothing of substance 
to this case; nor are they part of the record below. 
740 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1987). 
498 P.2d 175, (Ariz. App. 1972). 
31 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the 
decision of the District Court granting Salt Lake County's and 
Wallace Ray Noble's motion for summary judgment. 
Dated this /£ day of *rk&uM^, 1991. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
PAUL G. MAUGHAN 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Appellee 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al. 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS SALT 
LAKE COUNTY'S, WALLACE RAY 
NOBLE'S AND SALT LAKE COUNTY 
PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C86-553 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Defendants' Salt Lake County, Wallace Ray Noble and Salt 
Lake County Public Works Department's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was heard by the above-entitled Court on the 30th day 
of July, 1987, at the hour of 8:30 a.m. Present were Paul G. 
Maughan, counsel for the above-named defendants and Daniel F. 
Bertch, attorney for the plaintiffs. The Court having been 
fully apprised in the premises and having considered the 
pleadings on file, and the respective memoranda, affidavits and 
arguments of counsel, enters its order and finds as follows: 
1. No material fact exists in this action which would 
preclude the Court from entering an Order of Summary Judgment. 
2. The Governmental Immunity Act as applied in this 
action is constitutional in all regards and does not violate 
the provisions of Article I, Section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution. The Court further finds that the plaintiffs have 
not been deprived of their First, Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment 
rights under the United States Constitution by virtue of Salt 
Lake County's having issued a Notice and Order to Vacate the 
plaintiff's premises. 
3. The issuance or failure to issue building permit, 
the granting or failure to grant certificates of occupany and 
the granting or withholding of other similar authorization and 
the making or failure to make inspections under the Uniform 
Building Code constitute governmental functions for which 
immunity has not been waived under the state's Governmental 
Immunity Act, Section 63-30-10 (1) (c) and (d). Salt Lake 
County, Wallace Ray Noble and Salt Lake County Public Works 
Department are immune from suit and protected from liability 
under the provisions of this Act, 
4. The plaintiffs, in their amended complaint, have 
failed to adequately state a cause of action in fraud either 
against the County, the County Public Works Department or 
against Wallace Ray Noble, in either his official or individual 
capacity for which relief can be granted. 
5. The plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of 
action for which relief can be granted against these defendants 
outside the scope of the Governmental Immunity Act. In 
accordance therewith, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
foregoing defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as 
- 2 -
00 
to the plaintiff's first, second and third causes of action 
against these defendants as set forth in plaintiffs1 Second 
Revised Substitute Third Amended Complaint. It is further 
ordered that plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
denied.
 r 
DATED this If day of fpx&i, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
PAT B. BRIAN 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
?^ < T ~ , )^.-*sZ-
Order prepared by Mr. Maughan 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
\ 0 C'^ s-;r 
Daniel F. Bertch 




Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputa-
tion, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a 
party. 1896 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from 
suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from 
suit for any injury which results from the exercise of 
a governmental function, governmentally-owned 
hospital, nursing home, or other governmental 
health care facility, and from an approved medical, 
nursing, or other professional health care clinical 
training program conducted in either public or 
private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other 
natural disasters and the construction, repair, and 
operation of flood and storm systems by governm-
ental entities are considered to be governmental 
functions, and governmental entities and their offi-
cers and employees are immune from suit for any 
injury or damage resulting from those activities. 19»5 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as 
admission or denial of liability - Effect of waiver 
of immunity - Exclusive remedy - Joinder of 
employee - Limitations on personal liability. 
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless spe-
cifically provided, shall be construed as an admis-
sion or denial of liability or responsibility in so far 
as governmental entities or their employees are 
concerned. If immunity from suit is waived by this 
chapter, consent to be sued is granted and liability 
of the entity shall be determined as if the entity were 
a private person. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as 
adversely affecting any immunity from suit which a 
governmental entity or employee may otherwise 
assert under state or federal law. 
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or 
its employee for an injury caused by an act or 
omission which occurs during the performance of 
such employee's duties, within the scope of emplo-
yment, or under color of authority is, after the eff-
ective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil 
action or proceeding by reason of the same subject 
matter against the employee or the estate of the 
employee whose act or omission gave rise to the 
claim, unless the employee acted or failed to act 
through fraud or malice. 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action 
against a governmental entity in a representative 
capacity if the act or omission complained of is one 
for which the governmental entity may be liable, but 
no employee may be held personally liable for acts 
or omissions occurring during the performance of 
the employee's duties, within the scope of employ-
ment or under color of authority, unless it is estab-
lished that the employee acted or failed to act due to 
fraud or malice. 19S3 
by negligent act or omission of employee -
Exceptions - Waiver for injury caused by 
violation of fourth amendment rights. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental enti-
ties is waived for injury proximately caused by a 
negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or 
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function, whether or not the discretion is abused; or 
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false impris-
onment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intent-
ional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of 
mental anguish, or civil rights; or 
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspen-
sion, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to 
issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, 
certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; 
or 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspec-
tion, or by reason of making an inadequate or 
negligent inspection of any property; or 
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution 
of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if 
malicious or without probable cause; or 
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the 
employee whether or not it is negligent or intenti-
onal; or 
(g) arises out of or results from riots* unlawful 
assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, 
and civil disturbances; or 
(h) arises out of or in connection with the col-
lection of and assessment of taxes; or 
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah Nati-
onal Guard; or 
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person 
in any state prison, county, or city jail or other 
place of legal confinement; or 
(k) arises from any natural condition on state 
lands or the result of any activity authorized by the 
State Land Board; or 
(1) arises out of the activities of providing 
emergency medical assistance, fighting fire, handling 
hazardous materials, or emergency evacuations. 
(2) Immunity from suit of all governmental enti-
ties is waived for injury proximately caused or 
arising out of a violation of protected fourth ame-
ndment rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 
which shall be the exclusive remedy for injuries to 
those protected rights. If Section 78-16-5 or 
Subsection 77-35-12(g) or any parts thereof are 
held invalid or unconstitutional, this Subsection (2) 
shall be void and governmental entities shall remain 
immune from suit for violations of fourth amend-
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D struct, steel D underground 
D masonry D insulation 
O columns D drywall 
O frame D susp. ceiling 
D rough D trusses 
D nailing D 
D-flush test 





D make necessary corrections 
D remspecuon reqtared 
D revtspectton fee required 
pnor to remspection 
D prior violations not corrected 
D^pnor violations corrected 
D items listed below will be 
inspected at next regular inspection 
• UNABLE TO WAKE INSPECTION D Cannot locate structure or unrL D Building inaccess&le/locked 
Q Need Revised Plans Approved 
U Approved plans not available 
• STOP WORK Q issued Stop Work Order to _ 
• Procure All Required Permits 
•ENTS 
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Mr. Dell Bartel 
715 East 3900 South, Suite #12 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Mr. Robert DeBry 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Gentlemen: 
SUBJECT: Building Permit required for building at 4252 South 
700 East, Salt Lake County, Utah 
On March 17, 1986, I made an on-site inspection and found the 
following deficiencies that must be corrected and completed 
within 30 working days, upon receipt of this letter, in order 
to stop any legal action. 
Some of the items listed below are self explanatory and some 
are of technical nature. I will try to explain the technical 
ones in order to assure you understand what is to be done. 
1. Handicap hardware is required in rest rooms on main floor. 
2. All rest rooms will have stall partitions to separate the 
fixtures one from another. 
3. All fixtures will be sealed at point of contact with walls 
and floors. 
4. A ceiling tile is missing in the library. 
5. Electrical junction boxes are open with no covers for 
protection thru out ceiling and floor spaces. 
6. Air conditioners are not completed. 
7. Water is leaking into mens room on second floor thru the 
vent fan. 
TTv'U A "U4 A. Hnii 
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8. Stairway is not anchored or finished west side of building 
from second floor. 
9. Main stairs in foyer are 12'8M in rise without a landing to 
reduce the long run. 
10. Footings are exposed without the required protection east, 
west, north, and south sides of building. 
11. Window on east side is not protected and is sitting on the 
footing of building. 
12. The suspended ceiling is not anchored as per seismic 
regulations. 
13. The light fixtures that are suspended by the ceiling grids 
are not anchored per seismic regulations. 
14. The areas between the floor and ceiling and the areas 
between the ceiling and the roof must be separated into 
3,000 sq. ft. areas by a draft stop consisting of at least 
1/2" sheet rock. 
15. Lateral bracing is called for by plan and must be justified 
by the engineer of record that it is in as he called it. 
16. The bearing plates called for on the plan are not in place 
and must be placed according to the engineer, of record, 
specifications. 
17. The girder saddles must be bolted as per good workmanship 
and as per code. This means if four bolts are called for 
then they must be installed with nuts and washers as would 
be expected of any bolted connection. 
18. Electrical branch panels must have overload protection 
breakers installed. 
19. Grading and landscaping to be done as per conditional use 
permit. 
20. The fence is falling and must be redone to assure it will 
not fail. 
21. Drive approach, curb, gutter and sidewalk to be installed 
as per conditional use requirements* 
22. The front door foyer is not built as per plan. 
23. Engineer calculations are required for plan so permit can 
ha Issued. 
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24. The plans are to be completed with the corrections as shown 
on the plan check sheet. 
25. The on-site and off-site requirements are to be bonded as 
per attached notice. 
26. The permit application shall be filled out and the fees 
paid as per the plan check which will include a double fee 
for building without a permit. 
If you have any questions concerning the above list of 
requirements, feel free to contact myself or a plan checker in 
our office at any time. 
Sincerely, 
WALLACE R. NOBLE, Chief Building Official 
Development Services Division 
WRlT/jb 
cc: Paul Maughn 
APPENDIX E 
SALT LAKE COUNTY PUBLIC WORXS DEPARTMENT 
DEVELOPMENT SERVICES DIVISION 
2033 South State 
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RECORDS MANAGEMEMT 
a BUSINESS LICENSE 
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488-5000 
May 15, 1986 
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KEN JONES Mr. Robert J. DeBry 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Dear Mr. DeBry: 
SUBJECT: Property located at 4252 South -700 East 
As per my letter of March 19, 1986, I am hereby notifying you 
that you are in violation of the Building Code for occupying 
the building at the above referenced property without a 
-Certificate of Occupancy". I have been instructed by the 
County Attorney to not make any further inspections of the 
building located at the above referenced location until the 
building permit is, in fact, taken out. As per your letter and 
in answer to the questions therein, I can only say you are 
receiving incorrect information. Listed below is the correct 
information. 
No permit other than the footing and foundation permit has been 
issued. 
The sub-permits were issued but they were not the ones in 
question. 
When the permit is in fact taken out we will make the 
inspection. 
The defects or problems in the building have no bearing on 
whether or not a permit will be issued. 
The State Department of Contractors has a license listed for 
Cascade Construction. 
VALLACZ R. NOBLE, Chief Building Official 
Development Services Division 
WRH/jfc 
APPENDIX F 
S A L T L A K E C O U N T Y 
D E V E L O P M E N T S E R V I C E S D I V I S I O N 
2033 South S t a t e S t r e e t 
S a l t Lako C i t y , Utah SAMS
 D a t e i s s u e d N o v > 
C e r t . Mail No.p 
Date or S e r v i c e 
NOTICE AND OEDEE 
To: Mr. "Robert DeBry 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Re: Office Building at 4252 South 700 East 
Notice: The referenced building is being occupied in violation of 
Section 307 (a) of the Uniform Building Code, in that there 
is no valid "Certificate of Occupancy", the "Temporary 
Certificate of Occupancy" issued December 6, 1985, has 
expired, and the corrections required by this department on 
March 19, 1986, subsequent to a requested inspection 
performed by this department hayje^nnt ho on -.aje. 
Order: Yoy^-ice hereby ordered to^vacate the building within 10 
^dav^^ Furthermore, the building shall "rHSliLa.!*: Lrrio-e-eupr 
until such time as a valid "Certificate of Occupancy" is 
issued. 
A "Certificate of Occupancy" will be issued only after 
submittal and approval of as-built drawings, certification 
from a licensed engineer as to the adequacy of the 
structure, payment of all fees prescribed by law, and a 
final inspection showing compliance with code requirements. 
The final inspection will not be performed until the 
aforementioned administrative requirements have been met. 
This order is issued under authority of Section 202 (e) of 
the Uniform Building Code. 
Sincerely, 
CARL ERIKSSON, Section Manager 
Inspection Services 
CE/jb 
cc: Paul Maughn, Deputy County Attorney 
APPENDIX G 
Appeal of Mr. Robert J. 
DeBry Regarding Notice 
and Order to Vacate 
Notice of Decision 
On December 12, 1986, a hearing was held before the Salt Lake County 
Board of Appeals at 9:00 a.m. to consider the appeal by Mr. Robert DeBry 
of a notice and order issued by Salt Lake County ordering Mr. De3ry to 
vacate the building located at 4252 South 700 East in Salt Lake County. 
Two items were presented to the Board of Appeals: (a) a request for 
Salt Lake County to perform an inspection of the building and to info — 
Mr. DeBry of building code violations, and (b) a request for an extension 
of time in which to vacate the building beyond the ten days allowed by 
the Building Official. 
The Board heard presentations by Mr. DeBry and others on behalf of 
the matters before the Board, heard the presentation on behalf of Salt 
Lake County by Mr. Maughan, and heard statements by Mr. Bartel, the 
builder of the building. 
Having reviewed the written materials presented by Mr. DeBry, 
considered the statements made at the hearing, and consulted with and 
been advised by Salt Lake City Attorney's Office regarding the issues 
presented, the Board of Appeals orders as follows: 
-1-
Exhibit "C" 
t. Br. fitelry i* to craplf trith th« provisions of Mr. Eriksson's 
letter of November 17, 1986, before any inspections need be made by the 
County. Specifically, before any further inspections are made, as-built 
drawings in sufficient detail,for which a building permit could be 
issued, certified by licensed engineers and a licensed architect are 
submitted to Salt Lake County. All required fees are to be paid and a 
building permit issued by the County. 
2. Mr. DeBry's request for an extension of time beyond the ten days 
set forth in the notice and order dated November 3, 1986, is denied. The 
ten day period shall commence to run as of December 12, 1986. 
DATED th is J) &<C day of A A ^ O . 19 <rC 
Enclosure 
1) November 17th Letter 
2) Notice and Order 
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF APPEALS 
By. zu OlA 
Don Wakefield 
Chairman 
JLe^ 
/ 
002725 
